Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg: Thou Shalt Not Kill, Unless Your State Permits Physician-Assisted Suicide by Bradford, Jennifer
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 1 Article 5
12-15-1998
Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg: Thou
Shalt Not Kill, Unless Your State Permits Physician-
Assisted Suicide
Jennifer Bradford
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Medical
Jurisprudence Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jennifer Bradford Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg: Thou Shalt Not Kill, Unless Your State Permits Physician-Assisted Suicide ,
26 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 1 (1999)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/5
Vacco v. Quill and Washington v.
Glucksberg: Thou Shalt Not Kill, Unless
Your State Permits Physician-Assisted
Suicide
I. INTRODUCTION
As you approach your twilight years, it may be difficult to come to terms with
your mortality. However, if you were diagnosed with a fatal disease and faced the
possibility of spending your last minutes on this earth suffering in excruciating
pain, the idea of death may well be very comforting. The Supreme Court recently
decided two cases dealing with a terminally ill patient's right to die.' The Supreme
Court essentially side stepped the issue and left it to the individual states to pass
legislation regarding whether a patient with a- fatal disease has the right to
physician-assisted suicide.2
This Note will examine the Court's decisions in Vacco and Glucksberg and
discuss their implications on a terminally ill patient's right to die. Part II traces the
history of the Court's expansion of constitutional rights and its interpretation of the
right to die.' Part III presents the facts and procedural history of Vacco and
Glucksberg,4 followed by an analysis of the majority and the concurring opinions
in Part IV.5 Part V then considers Vacco's and Glucksberg's judicial, legislative,
and social impact.6 Part VI concludes with a look at the future of physician-
assisted suicide in light of the Court's decisions in Vacco and Glucksberg.7
1. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997).
2. See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2302; Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275.
3. See infra notes 8-148 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 149-72 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 173-216 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 217-68 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
1I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process
1. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution' provides that similarly situated people must receive similar
treatment.9 However, this constitutional guarantee does not forbid states from
drafting legislation which imposes classifications on differently situated people. l
Depending on the class of persons subject to discrimination, the courts use three
different levels of review in determining whether the governmental classification
has violated the Equal Protection Clause: strict scrutiny, middle-level review, and
rational basis."
Strict scrutiny is the standard of review reserved for situations where the law
involves a suspect classification or impairs a constitutional fundamental right.
12
Suspect classifications are defined as those classifications based on race, national
origin, or alienage. 3 In order to survive strict scrutiny review, the suspect
classification must be deemed necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
14
Courts use a middle-level or level of intermediate review to evaluate semisuspect
classifications, such as gender and illegitimacy. 5 Under this standard of review,
classifications must "serve important governmental objectives and must be
8. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Elizabeth Gmyrek England, Note, The Debate on
Physician-Assisted Suicide Reaches the Federal Courts. A Discussion of the Decisions of the District
and Circuit Courts in Compassion in Dying v. Washington State, 16 PACE L. REV. 359,383-88 (1996)
(discussing Equal Protection cases in depth).
9. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citations omitted); F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
10. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 ("'[Tjhe Constitution does not require things which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same."' (quoting Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940))); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
11. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (defining the strict scrutiny standard, the
intermediate level of review standard, and the rational basis standard).
12. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (citations
omitted).
13. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,440-42 (1985); Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (race); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971)
(alienage); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948) (ancestry).
14. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
15. See, e.g., Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (citations omitted); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978)
(illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender).
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substantially related to achievement of those objectives."'16 A rational basis
standard of review applies to all other classifications which neither burden a
fundamental right nor involve a suspect classification. 7 When employing the
rational basis standard, the courts are highly deferential to legislatures and the
legislation is entitled to a presumption of validity as long as the classification is
"rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 8 Rationally related has been
defined by the Court as ajustification which is "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation.""
2. Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution 20 also provides that it is improper to place undue burdens on the
exercise of a protected liberty interest.2' The Due Process Clause limits the
substantive power of the states to regulate certain areas of human life.22 In
analyzing whether a state has run afoul of the Due Process Clause, it is necessary
to determine whether the state law has infringed upon a fundamental right.23 The
Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights which are "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and traditions" 24 and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.,
25
Typical fundamental rights include the right to associate,26 the right to travel,27 and
16. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
17. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (citations omitted).
The rational basis test is often used for social and economic legislation. See id.
18. See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440.
19. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
20. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
22. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). See generally
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom: From Quinlan to Cruzan,
Glucksberg, and Vacco-a Brief History andAnalysis of Constitutional Protection of the 'Right to Die,'
278 JAMA 1523 (1997) (stating that the government cannot act in an irrational, arbitrary, or
unreasonable manner). The Court does not simply pick out particular activities to protect, but
recognizes established constitutional rights and gives them the protection the Constitution itself
requires. See San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 31 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642(1969)).
23. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion).
24. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
25. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
26. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
27. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630.
the right to privacy.28 If a law infringes upon a fundamental right, then it is
necessary to apply a strict scrutiny standard of review.29 Strict scrutiny requires
that the law must be deemed necessary to further a compelling state interest.3 ° If
no fundamental right exists, then courts utilize a rational basis standard of review.31
A rational basis level of review requires that the law be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest.32 The standard of review a court applies is a
crucial factor in determining whether a law is invalidated or upheld.33 The rational
basis standard of review is not very rigorous, and laws subjected to this standard
of review are almost always upheld.34 However, laws subjected to a strict scrutiny
level of review are almost always invalidated because the burden of the state to
offer a compelling state interest to justify an infringement on a fundamental right
is difficult to meet.35
B. Right to Privacy
The fundamental right to privacy has often been called the right to personal
autonomy.36 Even though the Constitution makes no explicit reference to a right
of privacy,37 several of the amendments in the Bill of Rights implicitly protect the
individual privacy interests by creating a "penumbra" or "zone" of privacy.38
The first case to recognize an individual's right to privacy was Griswold v.
Connecticut.39 In Griswold, the Court declared a fundamental right for married
individuals to use birth control and determine child bearing decisions.40 The Court
extended the right to use contraceptives to all individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird.4'
In Eisenstadt, the Court held that "[i]f the right [to] privacy means anything, it is
28. See infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
30. See, e.g., id.
31. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978).
32. See, e.g., id.
33. See Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful Life?, 70 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 519, 546 (1995).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("These matters, involving
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."). See
generally England, supra note 8, at 371-78 (discussing right to privacy cases in depth).
37. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
38. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482-85 (1965) (explaining how the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments collectively establish a zone in which "privacy is protected
from governmental intrusion").
39. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. See id. at 485-86.
41. 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
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the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child. ' '42  Roe v. Wade43 and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey4 extended the right to privacy concerning child bearing
decisions, which was established in Griswold and Eisenstadt, to include a
prohibition on state laws that completely ban abortions. 45 The Court stated that it
is impermissible to unduly burden a woman's right to have an abortion.4
Moreover, numerous cases also recognized a fundamental right to privacy in
controlling family life and relations. 47 However, in recent years, the Court has
been reluctant to expand the protected right to privacy to other activities; thus, the
Court has not found new fundamental rights.48 In Bowers v. Hardwick,49 the Court
made a broad statement about the proper role for the judiciary in recognizing new
fundamental rights.50 The Court stated that it is "most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."'"
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that " [t]here should be, therefore, great resistance
to expand the substantive reach of those clauses [the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], particularly if it requires redefining the
category of rights deemed to be fundamental. 5 2 As a result, the Court is now
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process and declare new
fundamental rights, such as a general right to die.53
42. Id. at 453-54 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
45. See id. at 846.
46. See id.
47. See generally Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that there is
a fundamental right for relatives to live together); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that
there is a fundamental right to marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that there
is a fundamental right to control procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding
that there is a fundamental right to control and direct child rearing and education).
48. See Kenneth R. Thomas, Confronting End-of-Life Decisions: Should We Expand the Right to
Die?, FED. LAW., May 1997, at 30, 35-36.
49. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
50. See generally id. (rejecting the notion that there is a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
activity).
51. Id. at 194.
52. Id. at 195.
53. See Thomas, supra note 48, at 36.
C. Right to Die
In discussing the general right to die, there are five different categories
involved, each addressing different legal issues: suicide, passive euthanasia,
physician-assisted suicide, active euthanasia, and palliative care. 4
1. Suicide
Under English common law, committing suicide was a criminal act. In the
early years of our country, many states adopted the policy of English common law
and regarded suicide as a criminal act.56 Modernly, however, committing suicide
imposes no criminal punishment or civil liability. 7
2. Passive Euthanasia
Passive euthanasia involves allowing a person to die because the patient
refuses or withdraws from medical treatment. 8 Some courts have held that a
patient's right to refuse or discontinue unwanted medical treatment derives from
the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy, while other courts maintain that the
right is rooted in the common law doctrine of informed consent6 Still, other
courts have held that the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment is rooted in
both the constitutionally protected right to privacy and the common law doctrine
of informed consent.6' Today, the well-recognized right to passive euthanasia is
familiar; however, this right was the subject of much debate not very long ago.62
In the seminal case of In re Quinlan,63 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
a patient had a right to terminate medical treatment in order to end the patient's life
54. See id. at 31.
55. See id. at 32.
56. See Peter G. Daniels, An Illinois Physician-Assisted Suicide Act: A Merciful End to a
Terminally Ill Criminal Tradition, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 763, 765 (1997).
57. See Thomas, supra note 48, at 31. Despite the lack of any legal punishment, committing
suicide may result in the forfeiture of life insurance benefits. See id.
58. See id.
59. See England, supra note 8, at 377 (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976)). For a
discussion of the Quinlan decision, see infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
60. See England, supra note 8, at 377 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990)). For a discussion of the Cruzan decision, see infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
61. See England, supra note 8, at 377-78 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (holding that the right to refuse chemotherapy derives from
both the constitutional right to privacy and the common law right of informed consent)).
62. See generally Gostin, supra note 22 (discussing the historical roots of a patient's right to refuse
medical treatment). Before Quinlan and Cruzan, many people believed that the decision to terminate
life sustaining medical treatment was unethical and unlawful. See id.
63. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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under certain conditions.' The court derived the right to discontinue medical
treatment from the implicit right to privacy found in the Fourteenth Amendment.65
The court stated that the implicit right was "[p]resumably ... broad enough to
encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain
circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions.' ' 66 However,
the court reasoned that this right was limited due to the important state interest of
preserving life. 67 The court did indicate, however, that the state's important interest
diminished as the "degree of bodily invasion [for medical treatment] increases and
the [patient's] prognosis dims."68  Furthermore, the court determined that a
competent patient or the guardian of an incompetent patient under the
circumstances of this case could make the decision to terminate medical
treatment. 69 The court also stated that a physician would not be held criminally
liable for withdrawing life sustaining medical treatment in circumstances similar
to this case.7 ° Additionally, the court extended protection from prosecution to third
parties who helped the patient terminate medical treatment pursuant to the patient's
right to privacy.71
While many state courts found a valid right to refuse unwanted medical
72 7treatment, it was not until Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health73
that the Supreme Court addressed the issue. In Cruzan, the Court held that a
"competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment. 7 4 The Court further held that a patient's right to
refuse medical treatment may outweigh the important state interest of preserving
life in some situations.75 However, the Court felt that a competent patient's right
64. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663. In this case, the patient was in a "chronic persistent vegetative
state" with no hope of recovery. See id. at 654.
65. See id. at 663.
66. See id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
67. See id.
68. See id. at 664.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 669. The court came to their conclusion partly because when the life support
equipment was withdrawn, the patient died from the natural causes of the underlying disease. See id.
at 670.
71. See id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,445-46 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 481 (1965)).
72. See Jeremy A. Sitcoff, Note, Death with Dignity: AIDS and a Callfor Legislation Securing
the Right to Assisted Suicide, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 677, 690 (1996) (citing ALAN MEISEL, 1 THE
RIGHT TO DIE 4, 45 n.6 (2d ed. 1995)).
73. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
74. Id. at 278.
75. See id. at 279-80.
to decline artificial life sustaining measures, such as hydration and nutrition, would
outweigh any of the state's countervailing interests, such as preserving life.76
Moreover, the Court reasoned that the "choice between life and death is a deeply
personal decision" in which the "Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as
well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment. "7 In deciding the
outcome of Cruzan, the Court placed great significance on common law, which
considered forced medication a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting a
patient's decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 78 If the patient was
incompetent, as in Cruzan, the Court stated that a surrogate decision maker could
exercise the right to withdraw medical treatment.79 The Cruzan decision initiated
a debate over the scope of a person's right to die, including whether or not Cruzan
opened the door to physician-assisted suicide."
3. Physician-Assisted Suicide
Physician-assisted suicide involves the situation where a physician gives a
person wishing to commit suicide the means to carry out the suicide.8 While the
line between physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia blurs, there is an important
distinction. 2 Physician-assisted suicide refers to the situation where a physician
provides a patient with the means to end her life, such as a lethal dosage of drugs,
but the patient actually performs the death-causing act herself, such as injecting
herself with the drug.83 On the other hand, active euthanasia refers to the situation
where a physician participates in performing the action that ends a patient's life,
such as by actually administering the lethal dosage of drugs to a patient. 4
In the case of physician-assisted suicide, the person assisting the suicide
receives immunity from a homicide charge because the patient completes the fatal
procedure.85 However, the person assisting the suicide is not totally immune from
76. See id. at 279.
77. Seeid.at281.
78. See id. at 269-77.
79. See id. at 280. Because of the state's interest in preserving life, the Court held that the state
could implement a clear and convincing evidence standard in order for the surrogate to make the
decision for the incompetent patient. See id. at 280-85 (citations omitted).
80. See Daniels, supra note 56, at 769.
81. See Thomas, supra note 48, at 31.
82. See England, supra note 8, at 360 (citing John Glasson, M.D., Report of the Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association; Physician-Assisted Suicide, 10 ISSUES L.
& MED. 91, 92 (1994)); see also Thomas, supra note 48, at 36 (noting important and practical
differences between physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia that justify separate legal
treatment).
83. See England, supra note 8, at 360 (citing Glasson, supra note 82, at 92 (reporting on the ethical
considerations associated with physician-assisted suicide)).
84. See id. (citing Glasson, supra note 82, at 92); infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text
(defining active euthanasia and discussing its treatment as a homicide).
85. See Thomas, supra note 48, at 36.
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criminal charges because most states have separate criminal statutes dealing with
physician-assisted suicide, which is currently against the law in a majority of
states.86 In thirty-five states there are statutes imposing penalties for physician-
assisted suicide, while nine other states impose penalties through case law. 7 .
However, several states have tried to enact legislation which would legalize
physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill.88 California was the first state to
attempt to legalize physician-assisted suicide with the 1988 California Humane and
Dignified Death Initiative.89 However, the initiative was never put to a vote
because it failed to attain the number of signatures required to get the initiative on
the ballot.9° In 1991, Washington became the first state to have a physician-
assisted suicide initiative reach the voters. 9 However, the voters rejected the
ground-breaking initiative by a vote of fifty-four percent to forty-six percent.92 In
1992, four other states introduced bills into their legislatures, none of which passed
into law.93 In the same year, California voters again rejected a physician-assisted
suicide proposal, one with considerably stricter guidelines than the 1991
Washington initiative, by a vote of fifty-two percent to forty-eight percent 4
Presently, Oregon is the only state where legislation legalizing physician-
assisted suicide has passed, although by the narrowest of margins, fifty-one percent
86. See id.; Gostin, supra note 22, at 1524-25.
87. See Gostin, supra note 22, at 1525.
88. See Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask-Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1318-19 (1993).
89. See id. The initiative required the patient to be terminally ill and competent. See id.
90. See id. at 1318.
91. See id. at 1320. The Aid in Dying Act was the initiative's popular name. See id. at 1319
(noting that the initiative was to amend sections 70.122.010-.905 of the Revised Code of Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.010-.905 (1990)). The initiative required that the patient be terminally
ill with two doctors estimating death within the following six months, that the patient be mentally
competent, and that the patient make a written request for assistance. !See id.
92. See Jane Gross, Voters Turn Down Mercy Killing Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at B1. The
ballot's defeat was likely due to inadequate drafting rather than lack of support by voters for the practice
of physician-assisted suicide. See Pugliese, supra note 88, at 1320.
93. See Pugliese, supra note 88, at 1319. The four states were Iowa, Maine, Michigan, and New
Hampshire. See id. (citing S.P. 2066, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1992); S.P. 885, 115th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Me. 1992); H.R. 5415, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1992); H.R. 1275, 152d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.H. 1992)). All of the bills died in their appropriate legislatures. See id. at 1319 n.220.
94. See id. at 1320; Sandi Dolbee, Right-to-Die Measure Rejected by State Voters: Lack of
Safeguards a Major Factor, Opponents Believed, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Nov. 4, 1992, at A3. The
proposition required that the patient have a terminal illness which would result in death within six
months in the opinion of two physicians. See Pugliese, supra note 88, at 1320 (indicating that sections
2525-2525.24 of the California Civil Code, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2525-2525.24 (West 1992), would
codify the proposition).
to forty-nine percent. 95 Voters passed the Death with Dignity Act9 6 in 1994, but
due to appeals, it did not go into effect until 1997.97 Under the Oregon Act, a
competent, adult resident who is terminally ill may make a written request for
medication for the "purpose of ending his life in a humane and dignified manner." 98
The physician involved must determine whether the patient has a terminal illness
and is making a voluntary request. 99 Additionally, the physician must inform the
patient of his medical diagnosis, prognosis, the risks of taking the requested
medication, the probable outcome if the patient decides to go through with the plan,
and feasible alternatives available.' ° It is then necessary to refer the patient to a
consulting physician, who must confirm the diagnosis of the patient and the
patient's ability to act voluntarily.'0 ' If a doctor determines the patient is suffering
from depression, then either physician must deny the request and refer the patient
for psychiatric counseling.' 2 Additionally, the qualified patient must make an oral
request, a written request, and another oral request reiterating his desire within
fifteen days of his initial request.0 3 The Oregon Act further mandates a fifteen day
waiting period between the initial request made by the patient and the writing of
the prescription by the physician, as well as a minimum forty-eight hour cooling-
off period between the written request and the writing of the prescription."
Since the Oregon vote, many state legislatures have introduced proposals to
legalize physician-assisted suicide, but none of the proposals have been enacted.'0 5
Many proposals closely parallel the Oregon Act, such as the ones in California and
Massachusetts; thus, they are referred to as Copycat Acts.'06 These Copycat Acts
contain identical safeguards and employ the same definitions as the Oregon Act.'07
Other proposals use broader language and appear more flexible, such as the one in
Michigan.'0t As to date, no legislature has enacted any of these proposed acts.
Conversely, Iowa and Rhode Island recently passed legislation which prohibits
95. See Daniels, supra note 56, at 786; Thomas, supra note 48, at 34.
96. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.810-.897 (1995).
97. See David G. Savage, High Court Oks Assisted Suicide Law in Oregon, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1997, at Al.
98. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805; Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 701-02.
99. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805; Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 702.
100. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815; Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 702.
101. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815; Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 702.
102. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825; Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 703.
103. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.840; Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 703.
104. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.850; Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 703.
105. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2266 n.15 (1997); Sitcoff, supra note 72, at
704.
106. See Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 704-05.
107. See id. at 705.
108. See id. The Michigan Act allows a patient to specify under which situations they will allow
physician-assisted suicide, thus not limiting the act to terminally ill patients. See id. at 706.
130
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physician-assisted suicide.' °9 Furthermore, in April, President Clinton signed the
Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restoration Act of 1997, which prohibits federal
funding of physician-assisted suicide."
Despite the prohibition of physician-assisted suicide, there appears to be a lack
of enforcement of the law because no American doctor has ever been convicted for
assisting a patient suicide."' Dr. Timothy Quill published an article in 1991
describing his experience with prescribing a lethal dose of pain killers to one of his
terminally ill patients." 2 However, a grand jury refused to indict the physician,
which is an "important indicator of the general direction of the debate over
euthanasia" and physician-assisted suicide in this country. 1 3 Additionally, Dr.
Jack Kevorkian has been acquitted in all of his trials involving physician-assisted
suicide.' "4 Moreover, public opinion polls consistently demonstrate growing public
support for physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill. "5 In 1950, only thirty-
four percent of the American population believed in the concept of physician-
assisted suicide." 6 This figure has steadily increased over the years, reaching its
highest approval percentage of eighty-one percent in 1991.' ' The legalization of
physician-assisted suicide is also gaining support from the medical community. "'
Despite the American Medical Association's firm stance against physician-assisted
suicide," 9 surveys reveal that individual doctors are in favor of physician-assisted
suicide.120
109. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 707A (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60 (West 1994
& Supp. 1997); Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2266 n.15.
110. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 14401-14408 (1994); Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2266.
111. See Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 693 (citations omitted).
112. See Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 691, 691 (1991); Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 693 & n. 118.
113. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dying? The Public
Perspective, 267 JAMA 2658, 2658-59 (1992).
114. See Jack Lessenberry, Kevorkian Wins Acquittal Again: "Jury Saved Me," SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 1996, at A3, available in 1996 WL 6443625.
115. See David Orentlicher, M.D., J.D., The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very
Modest Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443, 475 (1997).
116. See Blendon et al., supra note 113, at 2659 (indicating survey results from a Gallup Poll
Organization).
117. See id. at 2658-59 (indicating survey results from a Harvard School of Public Health and Boston
Globe Poll).
118. See England, supra note 8, at 365-66 (citations omitted).
119. See Jeremy Manier, AMA Affirms Opposition to Assisted Suicides, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 1996,
at 6, available in 1996 WL 2684422; Edward Walsh, AMA Delegates Assail Assistance in Suicides,
WASH. POST, June 26, 1996, at A3.
120. See England, supra note 8, at 365-66; Pugliese, supra note 88, at 1315 (indicating a 1988
survey by the San Francisco Medical Society revealing that a majority of physicians favored physician-
assisted suicide, with seventy percent replying that a terminally ill patient should have the option of
In addition, other countries are taking part in similar physician-assisted suicide
debate. 12' For example, the Netherlands was the first country to openly allow
physicians to assist terminally ill patients with suicide. 122 While euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide are still considered illegal in the Netherlands,
"physicians can avoid prosecution by adhering to strict [legal] guidelines. ''123
Prosecution will not result for a physician's role in assisting with a patient's suicide
if "the patient requested the procedure consciously and voluntarily, the patient was
experiencing suffering that could not be relieved by any other means, and the
physician had consulted with another physician who agreed that euthanasia was
acceptable under the circumstances."' 124 While the Dutch have spent incredible
efforts in establishing sufficient guidelines for physicians, the data obtained in
surveys indicates that the guidelines have become "dispensable ... rather than
essential requirements." 125 The Dutch Government's Commission on Euthanasia
commissioned a 1990 survey which found that there were over 1000 cases where
the patient did not explicitly request euthanasia and almost 5000 of 8750 cases
where the patient did not consent. 126 However, due to inaccurate reporting by
physicians, the true number of suicides in the Netherlands is not known, which has
given rise to much speculation on the actual results of the Dutch euthanasia
experiment. 127  Yet, the Dutch authorities have expressed their continued
satisfaction with their system, saying that "the medical actions and decision process
concerning the end of life are of high quality.' 28 The Swiss also allow "doctor-
assisted suicide in carefully controlled situations."'129 Conversely, Canadian courts
recently rejected a claim to establish physician-assisted suicide as a fundamental
right.130 A committee in Great Britain also "refused to recommend any change[s]
euthanasia).
121. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2266 n.16 (1997).
122. See Marlise Simons, Dutch Will Tighten Euthanasia Rules, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 11,
1995, at A5, available in 1995 WL 9190490.
123. See Orentlicher, supra note 115, at 460-61 (citations omitted).
124. See Stephen P. Williams, An Opportunity Slipping By: Why Lawyers Should Speak Up About
Physician Assisted Suicide, S.C. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 32, 35.
125. See Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1996).
126. See John Keown, Dutch Slide Down Euthanasia's Slippery Slope, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1991,
at Al 8. Professor Paul J. van der Maas directed the survey commissioned by the Dutch government.
See Callahan & White, supra note 125, at 15-16.
127. See Paul J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End
of Life, LANCET, Sept. 14, 1991, at 669, available in 1991 WL 4875055.
128. See Daniels, supra note 56, at 792 (quoting Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the
Slippery Slope?, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 261,282
(John Keown ed., 1995)).
129. See Seth Mydans, Australia Debates Voiding Law on Assisted Suicide, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Feb. 2, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL4139611.
130. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2266 n.16 (1997) (citing Rodriguez v. British
Columbia [1993] 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342).
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in ... [their physician-]assisted suicide prohibition."'13' Moreover, New Zealand's
Parliament rejected a proposal that would have legalized physician-assisted
suicide. 32 In Australia, the Northern Territory legalized physician-assisted suicide
and voluntary euthanasia in 1995,133 but the Australian Senate voted to overturn the
law in 1997.134 The law, which went into effect in 1996, was the first of its kind
which explicitly allowed physicians the right to help their patients commit
suicide. 135 During the year it was in effect, the law required that the patient be
mentally and physically competent, that the request be supported by three doctors,
including a specialist and a psychiatrist, and a nine day cooling-off period before
the death could proceed. 36 Even though Australia recently reversed its position on
physician-assisted suicide, Columbia's Constitutional Court recently legalized
voluntary euthanasia for terminally ill patients.'37
4. Active Euthanasia
Active euthanasia involves the killing of another person and occurs when a
physician actually administers a lethal treatment to a patient rather than just merely
prescribing the lethal treatment. 38 Currently, all fifty states consider euthanasia a
homicide because "a person cannot generally consent to a crime," such as the
killing of another person.'"9
5. Palliative Care
Palliative care refers to medical treatment which relieves pain, such as a high
dosage of drugs prescribed by a physician, even if the dosage might hasten death. 4 0
In an attempt to lessen a terminally ill patient's suffering and pain, dosages of pain
131. See id. (citations omitted).
132. See id. (citing Graeme, MPs Throw Out Euthanasia Bill, DOMINION (WELLINGTON), Aug. 17,
1995, at 1).
133. See Phillip Shenon, Australian Doctors Get Right to Assist Suicide, N.Y. T)MES, July 28, 1995,
at A8. Three people chose to end their lives with the assistance of their physicians. See Mydans, supra
note 129, at Al.
134. See Alan Thornhill, Australia Repeals Euthanasia Law: Doctors Helped Four Die Under
Territory's Legislation, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1997, at A14.
135. See Mydans, supra note 129, at Al.
136. See id.
137. See Colombia's Top Court Legalizes Euthanasia, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 22, 1997, at Al 8,
available in 1997 WL 2777486.
138. See Thomas, supra note 48, at 36.
139. See id.
140. See id.
medication can reach toxic levels, thereby killing the patient.14' Generally, a
physician who causes a patient's death due to palliative care is not punished
because the physician's intent is to relieve pain rather than to kill.
142
Regardless of whether the right to die is "exercised by refusal of treatment, by
assisted suicide, or by seeking euthanasia," the right derives from the fact that the
death is freely chosen. 143 Thus, when the issue of physician-assisted suicide came
before the Supreme Court in Vacco and Glucksberg, it came within the context of
cases and legislative proposals, as well as other countries' experiences with the
same issue, all of which carefully debated the rights of patients to make decisions
at the end of life.1" Even though the Court recognized a generalized right for
competent patients to refuse unwanted medical treatment in Cruzan, there was no
recognition of a general right to commit suicide, either alone or with the aid of a
physician. 45  "The courts .. . [have] persistently affirmed one categorical
distinction: that between withdrawing life-sustaining treatment on the one hand,
and active euthanasia or physician-assisted dying on the other."'' 46 Unlike the
situation in Cruzan, there has never been a long standing acceptance of suicide nor
has it received a protected status in our Nation's history.147 Thus, the Court did not
recognize a fundamental right to die. 48
IH. FACTS OF THE CASE
A. Vacco v. Quill
In Vacco, the plaintiffs were three terminally ill patients dying from cancer and
AIDS. 149 All three were mentally competent adults in the final stages of fatal
diseases and wanted their respective physicians to prescribe medications which
141. See Kenneth R. Thomas, The Right to Die: Where Do We Go from Here?, FED. LAW., Oct.
1997, at 22, 29.
142. See Thomas, supra note 48, at 36.
143. See Seth F. Kreimer, J.D., The Right to Die, 17 J. LEGALMED. 573, 576-77 (1996) (reviewing
MEISEL, supra note 72).
144. See Gostin, supra note 22, at 1526.
145. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2302 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
2275 (1997).
146. Gostin, supra note 22, at 1523.
147. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263. The liberty interest recognized in Cruzan "was not simply
deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy," but was rather based on common law notions
of forced battery. See id. at 2270. Decisions to commit suicide "may be just as personal and profound
as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection."
See id.
148. See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2296; Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275.
149. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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would quickly bring about their deaths. 5 ° Three physician plaintiffs joined in the
case stating that "in the regular course of their medical practice, they treated
terminally ill patients who requested assistance in the voluntary self-termination
of life."' 5' Furthermore, the physicians believed that it was consistent with modem
medical standards to prescribe drugs which would hasten their patients' deaths in
a "certain and humane manner."'5 Because of New York statutes that made it a
felony to intentionally help another person commit suicide,'53 the physicians
believed that they could not assist their terminally ill patients by prescribing the
requested drugs without facing criminal prosecution. 154 The plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of the New York statutes claiming that the patients had a
fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide155 under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution. 5 6 The United States District Court in the
Southern District of New York held that the patients had no fundamental right to
physician-assisted suicided protected by the Due Process Clause nor did the
statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause.'57 The district court rejected the
plaintiffs' claims, stating that fundamental rights are "deeply rooted in the nation's
history and traditions"'58 and because helping someone commit suicide has
traditionally been a crime in the majority of American states, physician-assisted
suicide is not deeply rooted in our history or traditions. 59 The district court also
held that New York had a rational basis for the legal distinction of allowing
patients to refuse medical treatment and not allowing physician-assisted suicide
because the distinction rested on the difference between natural and artificial death,
as well as New York's legitimate interest in preserving life. '60 The Second Circuit
of the United States Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling that no
fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide existed, but reversed the court's
150. See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 79-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716 (2nd Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
151. See id. at 80.
152. See id.
153. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.30, 125.15(3) (McKinney 1998).
154. See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 80.
155. See id.
156. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; supra notes 8-35 and accompanying text (giving the historical
context for the Supreme Court's standard of review and application of such review to due process
questions).
157. See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 84-85.
158. See id. at 83 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
159. See id. at 84 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990)); see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) (stating that it is a crime to cause, aid, or solicit a suicide).
160. See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 84.
holding that the statutes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.'6' The Second Circuit reasoned that the state's interest in preserving
life "lessens as the potential for life diminishes,"'162 and thus, the statutes which
prohibit physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients are not rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.
1 63
B. Washington v. Glucksberg
Like the plaintiffs in Vacco, the three terminally ill patients in Glucksberg
were mentally competent adults in the terminal phases of their illnesses and desired
to end their excruciating pain by taking prescribed drugs which would hasten their
deaths.' 64 Five physicians, who regularly treated terminally ill patients, joined as
plaintiffs in the case, as did Compassion in Dying, which provides services for
terminally ill patients.' 65 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the
Washington statutes 66 that prohibited assisting a suicide attempt. 167 The United
States District Court in the Western District of Washington held that competent,
terminally ill adults had a fundamental right to die protected by the Due Process
Clause because individuals have the right to make their own choices about "matters
which are essential to personal autonomy and basic human dignity."1
68
Furthermore, the district court held that there was a violation of the plaintiffs' equal
protection rights because the Washington law unconstitutionally distinguished
between two groups of similarly situated individuals; the law permitted mentally
competent, terminally ill patients to refuse life-sustaining equipment, but it
prohibited the same group of individuals to hasten death by taking prescribed
drugs. 69 A three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals overturned both of the district court's holdings. 7 ° However, upon
rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed the panel's findings and affirmed the
district court's holding that the plaintiffs had a fundamental right to die protected
by the Due Process Clause.'7 '
161. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724, 731 (2nd Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
162. See id. at 729 (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976)).
163. Seeid.at731.
164. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456-57 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'dsub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
165. See id. at 1457-58.
166. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.20.020(1) (c), .36.060(2) (West 1998).
167. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459.
168. See id. at 1461-62.
169. See id. at 1466-67.
170. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded,
79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
171. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). The court did not reconsider the issue of whether
the statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the above two cases and
heard the cases together to determine whether mentally competent, terminally ill
patients had a right to die with the aid of their physicians.'
7 2
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINIONS
A. The Majority Ruling
1. Vacco v. Quill
In Vacco, Chief Justice Rehnquist 7 3 discussed the equal protection claim and
held that New York's statutes prohibiting physician-assisted suicide did not violate
the Constitution. 7 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist began the opinion by stating that the
Equal Protection Clause requires that states treat similarly situated people the
same.'75 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the New York statutes deserved a
"'strong presumption of validity""76 because they do not infringe upon a
fundamental right nor involve suspect classifications, and therefore, the correct
level of scrutiny is the rational basis test. 177 Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the
claim that the statutes treated medically competent, terminally ill patients
differently; he reasoned that every competent person can refuse life sustaining
equipment, but no one may assist in a suicide. 78 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
that the important and rational distinction between physician-assisted suicide and
refusal of life sustaining equipment had been "widely recognized and endorsed in
the medical profession and in our legal traditions.'
79
Chief Justice Rehnquist also pointed out that if a patient refuses medical
treatment, the patient dies from the underlying terminal disease; however, when the
patient takes deadly drugs prescribed by a physician, death results from the lethal
172. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
173. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined ChiefJustice Rehnquist in the majority
opinion. See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2296.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 2297 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
176. See id. (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)).
177. See id. (citing Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267-71). The proper standard of review is the rational
basis test because the statutes neither infringe upon a fundamental right nor involve a suspect
classification. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (citing Heller, 509 U.S. at 319).
178. See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2297-98.
179. See id. at 2298 (citing Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
137
dosage of drugs, not the disease. 18° In further support, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that the majority of states prohibit physician-assisted suicide while
permitting the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.'8 ' States, New York
included, have consistently held that public policy requires drawing the line
between "'killing"' and "'letting die.'" 82  Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that the Supreme Court itself recognized the distinction between
making and letting a patient die in Cruzan."3 For all of these reasons, Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected the respondents' claim and declared that the statutes'
classifications withstood the rational basis test.184  Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded by stating that New York's justifications for the statutes, which are
discussed more fully in Glucksberg,15 were important state interests which "easily
satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational
relation to some legitimate end." '186
2. Washington v. Glucksberg
In Glucksberg,5 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist began the opinion by closely
examining the United States legal history and traditions regarding suicide and
physician-assisted suicide. 8 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that state
legislatures are "currently engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of
physician-assisted suicide."' 8 9  Chief Justice Rehnquist then considered the
respondents' constitutional claim that the Washington statutes violated the Due
Process Clause because they were in violation of a patient's fundamental right to
die. 9 ° Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that historically the right to physician-
assisted suicide has received consistent and almost universal rejection. 9 Chief
180. See id. (citing People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 718 (1994); Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209, 1226 (1985); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983); Glasson, supra note 82, at 92). There is
a difference between causation and intent. See id.
181. See id. at 2300 (citing Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2265-67).
182. See id. at 2301 (citations omitted).
183. See id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990)).
184. See id.
185. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
186. See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2302.
187. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in the majority
opinion. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2260-61 (1997).
188. See id. at 2262-67. "[F]or over 700 years, the Anglo-American common law tradition has
punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide." Id. at 2263 (citing Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 294-95 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
189. See id. at 2267.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 2269. The right to commit suicide with a physician's assistance has never received
protection in our nation's history. See id. Many states have begun to re-examine the prohibition
because of changes in medical technology; however, they have not retreated from the prohibition
because the laws have "consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide." See id.
at 2267.
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Justice Rehnquist next distinguished the Cruzan holding by asserting that Cruzan
involved forced medication, which was considered a battery at common law, and
therefore, a refusal of unwanted medication has enjoyed a long standing tradition
of judicial and legislative protection.'92 Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
that the Constitution does not "warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions" should receive constitutional
protection.'93 Thus, based on this country's long standing refusal to recognize
physician-assisted suicide, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that no fundamental
right was at issue before the Court. 194
Although there was an absence of a fundamental right, the majority did note
that it is possible for the Washington statutes to have a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest and therefore pass the requisite rational basis standard of
review.195 Chief Justice Rehnquist listed the following state interests that warrant
a ban on physician-assisted suicide: (1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; (3)
protecting a doctor's integrity and ethics; (4) protecting vulnerable people from
undue influence; and (5) preventing euthanasia from growing more popular, the so-
called slippery slope justification.' 96 Because these were the justifications asserted
in support of prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, the Washington statutes were
found to be rationally and reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. '9' Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded by pointing out that the majority holding permits the
states to engage in continued "debate about the morality, legality, and practicality
of physician-assisted suicide."'198 However, in a footnote, Chief Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that although the Court's decision rejected the circuit court's "specific
holding that the statute is unconstitutional 'as applied' to a particular class," 99 the
Court's "opinion does not absolutely foreclose" the possibility that a plaintiff could
prevail under circumstances different from the circumstances of this case.2'°
192. See id. at 2270.
193. See id. at 2271 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973)).
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 2272-75.
197. See id. at 2275.
198. See id.




Justice Souter wrote separate concurring opinions for each case. 20 1 He wrote
separately to address whether the statute imposes "'arbitrary impositions"' or
"'purposeful restraints"' inconsistent with the Due Process Clause.20 2 Justice
Souter believed that the state interest of "protecting patients from mistakenly and
involuntarily deciding to end their lives" was sufficient to justify the statutes.20 3 He
further stated that the Court preferred using the legislative process of each
individual state in order to decide whether to allow physician-assisted suicide
2! 4
2. Justice O'Connor
Concurring with the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor 2°5 wrote separately
to point out that there is no reason to decide whether terminally ill patients have a
constitutional right to obtain relief from their suffering because the patients could
obtain palliative care in both Washington and New York.20 6 She agreed with the
majority opinion that there is no generalized right to die, but left unresolved the
possibility that a limited right to have a physician prescribe drugs to alleviate
suffering might exist, even if these drugs would hasten death.207
3. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens used his concurring opinion to assert that there is room for
further debate on the constitutional limits placed on states when punishing
physician-assisted suicide.20 8 Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's
reasoning because he believed that there are situations where statutes, such as those
in New York and Washington, may be unconstitutional due to unique
circumstances, resulting in a legitimate interest in hastening death which would be
201. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. at 2275 (Souter, J., concurring).
202. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
203. See id. at 2290 (Souter, J., concurring).
204. See id. at 2292-93 (Souter, J., concurring).
205. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion. See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2302 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
206. See id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. See id. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring).
[Vol. 26: 121, 1998] Physician-Assisted Suicide
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
entitled to constitutional protection. °9 Moreover, he stated that the distinctions
between Cruzan and Vacco and Glucksberg is more blurred than the majority
opined.21 0 Furthermore, while the facial challenge of the statutes failed in these
cases, Justice Souter believed that there might be an individual plaintiff who could
prevail in a more particularized challenge.
2t 1
4. Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion merely reiterated her support for Justice
O'Connor's reasoning. 2
5. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer also wrote separately to support Justice O'Connor's stance, but
differed from the Court's reasoning that the right to physician-assisted suicide is
essentially the "right to commit suicide with another's assistance"; 213 rather, Justice
Breyer asserted that it was the "right to die with dignity. 2 14 He believed that the
right to die with dignity involves "personal control over the manner of death,
professional medical assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary and severe
physical suffering." 215 Justice Breyer could foresee a case where a state's ban on
physician-assisted suicide infringes upon a constitutional right
216
209. See id. at 2305 (Stevens, J., concurring).
210. See id. at 2305-07 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens believed that the freedom to refuse
unwanted medical treatment espoused in Cruzan also recognized the patient's interest in dignity and
determining the manner of death. See id. at 2306 (Stevens, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Stevens
thought that Cruzan implicitly recognized an "even more fundamental right to make this 'deeply
personal decision."' See id. at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
211. See id. at 2309 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens believed that these challenges merited
individual scrutiny depending on the specific facts of each case. See id. at 2310 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens rejected the notion that the state's interest in preserving life would always
be "sufficient to outweigh the interest in liberty that may justify the only possible means of preserving
a dying patient's dignity and alleviating her intolerable suffering." See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
212. See id. at 2310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
213. See id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
214. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
215. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
216. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring). The New York and Washington statutes did not prohibit
doctors from providing drugs to terminally ill patients in order to alleviate their pain, even if those drugs
carried a risk of killing the patient. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer believed that a
different outcome would occur if no palliative care was available to the patients. See id. at 2312
(Breyer, J., concurring).
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISIONS
A. Judicial Impact
The immediate judicial impact of Vacco and Glucksberg is precedent that there
is no fundamental right to die or right to physician-assisted suicide.217 However,
statutes such as those in New York and Washington, while not invalid on their
face, might be deemed unconstitutional when subjected to a particularized
challenge in the future.218  Despite the Court's unanimity in the Vacco and
Glucksberg decisions, the Court left open the possibility of a more particularized
challenge.1 9 In fact, five justices chose to write concurring opinions discussing the
statutes as applied to other circumstances, 20 and Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
disagree with the possibility of a more particularized challenge. 221 Justice Breyer
stated that it was possible to infringe upon a patient's liberty interest if the statute
prohibited "personal control over the . . . avoidance of unnecessary and severe
physical suffering., 222 A situation such as this may arise where there is no
palliative care available in the state.223 For example, a competent, terminally ill
patient, whose pain is not reduceable by any life sustaining method, might be able
to succeed with a constitutional claim for physician-assisted suicide if the state
prevented him from receiving relief from his pain.22 n Another situation where a
more particularized challenge might succeed is where a state subjects a physician
to severe criminal penalties for complying with a competent, terminally ill patient's
request for physician-assisted suicide because he is suffering in extraordinary
pain.225  Kathryn Tucker, the Seattle litigator who unsuccessfully brought the
Glucksberg Supreme Court challenge, plans to bring another claim to mandate
federal recognition of the right to have adequate access to pain medicine at the end
217. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2302 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
2275 (1997). See generally Cathy Lu, The Debate Over Physician-Assisted Suicide, 24 HUM. RTS. 4,
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218. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2309 (Stevens, J., concurring).
219. See Gostin, supra note 22, at 1523; Cass R. Sunstein, Supreme Caution: Once Again, the High
Court Takes Only Small Steps, WASH. POST, July 6, 1997, at C1.
220. Justices Souter, O'Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer each wrote concurring opinions. See
supra notes 201-16 and accompanying text.
221. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 n.24.
222. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
223. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REV. 56,
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224. See id. at 139.
225. See Gostin, supra note 22, at 1526.





The Court's decisions in Vacco and Glucksberg defer to the individual states
the responsibility of passing legislation which would either permit or prohibit
physician-assisted suicide.227 Oregon was the first state to pass legislation
legalizing physician-assisted suicide.228 The Supreme Court recently rejected
appeals of this statute, thereby affirming its decision to defer to the states on the
* 229SicOegissue. Since Oregon voters passed the Death with Dignity Act, many legislatures
have introduced similar proposals to legalize physician-assisted suicide; however,
to date, no other state legislature has enacted such a proposal.2 0 Due to the shifting
public and medical attitudes regarding the support for physician-assisted suicide,
other state legislatures might "follow the lead of Oregon and enact a law permitting
physician-assisted suicide. '23' State legislatures can also look to the Netherlands
for help in developing appropriate guidelines.232 While the Netherlands experience
shows the difficulty in legalizing physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, the
problems the Dutch encountered may be useful tools for state legislatures in
drafting effective legislation.233
The various attempts by state legislatures to legalize physician-assisted suicide
evidences the American concern for lessening the anguish of terminally ill
23patients. 34 However, the legislation aimed at helping terminally ill patients often
226. See David J. Garrow, Oregon Voters Give Big Win to Assisted-Suicide Cause, SEATrLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Nov 7, 1997, at A15, available in 1997 WL 15956382. Tucker contends that the five
concurring opinions call for a requirement of palliative care. See id.
227. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2302 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
2275 (1997).
228. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-897 (1995) (commonly known as the Death with Dignity Act).
229. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1431 (D. Or. 1995), vacated, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997). By dismissing the final appeals, the Supreme Court left the
decision regarding physician-assisted suicide to be resolved by individual states and their voters, not
federal judges. See William Claibome, A Harsh Look at Assisted Suicide; Oregon Opponents Try
Graphic Approach, WASH. POST, November 1, 1997, at Al.
230. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
231. See Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 695; Orentlicher, supra note 115, at 475.
232. See Pugliese, supra note 88, at 1324. But see Callahan & White, supra note 125, at 18
(questioning whether the United States can adequately monitor euthanasia and physician-assisted
suicide when the Netherlands has failed to do so); Kreimer, supra note 143, at 579 (discussing the
consequences of the American system which "reimburses health care on terms that threaten to
encourage abuse of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia").
233. See Orentlicher, supra note 115, at 460. The evidence from the Netherlands is "decidedly
mixed." See Gostin, supra note 22, at 1523.
234. See Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 706.
contains flaws which threaten the rights of terminally ill individuals.235 For
example, the Oregon Act, as well as the Copycat Acts, prohibit third parties from
administrating a lethal dosage of medication.236 Thus, the patients must administer
the medication themselves, which presents a potential obstacle for those patients
who are unable to carry out the act themselves due to a lack of physical strength
or capability of ingesting the medication. 237 Furthermore, the Oregon Act and the
Copycat Acts explicitly prohibit lethal injection by a physician, but "they are silent
on whether a patient has a right to self administer the lethal injection. 23 The
various acts should correct this oversight by allowing patients who cannot orally
ingest the dosage to end their lives through lethal injection. 239 Additionally, the
absence of any maximum waiting period in any of the various acts presents another
problem for terminally ill patients to overcome. 240 For example, if a patient who
has requested a lethal dosage to end her life becomes depressed or becomes
incompetent while waiting for the prescription, the patient's request risks
nullification.241 Thus, to ensure that physicians comply with their patient's wishes,
legislation should include a maximum waiting period.242 Moreover, those in the
medical field will have to decide their position on the issue before their patients ask
for their assistance.243 As one author has speculated, "'[i]f physician-assisted
suicide is sanctioned, some physicians may by law be forced to compromise their
values and act against their own conscience.' 244 In order to safeguard against
making physicians do things to which they are morally opposed, the state
legislation should not require a physician to participate, similar to the Oregon Act
that allows physicians to decide whether they will participate in physician-assisted
suicide.245 The goal of any death with dignity act should be to "promote more
humane living as well as more humane dying for terminally ill patients.'246
235. See id.
236. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.880 (1995); Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 706.
237. See Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 707.
238. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.880; Sitcoff, supra note 72, at 707.
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C. Social Impact
The most important social impact of Vacco and Glucksberg is the lack of a
uniform statute addressing the legality of physician-assisted suicide because the
Supreme Court left the decision to individual state legislatures. 47 Some states
could allow physician-assisted suicide while other states will prosecute
physicians.248 The Oregon statute is the first law of its kind in the United States,
but it contains various safeguards to protect both the patients and their
physicians. 249 Terminally ill patients must "follow a series of steps, including
examination by a second physician," a possible psychiatric evaluation if the patient
shows signs of depression, and documentation showing that the patient's actions
are voluntary. There is also a residency requirement in Oregon's statute,
although residency is not defined. 25 ' However, once the residency requirement is
met, the law allows physicians to prescribe lethal medication upon a terminally ill
patient's request. 252 The attending physician and a consulting physician must agree
that the patient has an incurable disease that will bring about death within six
months.2  There is also a fifteen day waiting period between the first request and
the writing of the prescription.254  Despite these safeguards, the lack of an
adequate definition for defining a resident may create the problem of "forum
shopping," whereby individuals might cross state lines in order to request
physician-assisted suicide.255 In addition, a lack of residency requirement in the
Australian physician-assisted suicide legislation provided a concern that the
Northern Territory of Australia might well become the "world's suicide capital,"
prompting the Australian government to overturn the law.256
Another major concern is the widely accepted fact that physician-assisted
suicide already occurs illegally in those states which continue to ban the practice.257
247. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
248. See Gostin, supra note 22, at 1529.
249. See Alexander Dylan Lowe, Facing the Final Exit, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 48, 51.
250. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.815, .820, .825; Lowe, supra note 249, at 51.
251. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.805, .860; Bob Sisson, Doctor-Assisted Suicide for Oregon
Residents Only, COLOMBIAN, Nov. 6, 1997, at AI, available in 1997 WL 13552782.
252. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805; Sisson, supra note 251, at Al.
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254. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.850; Sisson, supra note 251, at Al.
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256. See Mydans, supra note 129, at Al.
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There exists a great danger in practicing physician-assisted suicide illegally. 8
Fearing disapproval among other colleagues, as well as legal consequences,
physicians who engage in the practice of assisted suicide infrequently ask their
colleagues for second opinions in evaluating a patient's request for suicide.
2 5 9
Thus, the illicit practice of physician-assisted suicide, which will continue to occur
with or without Supreme Court support, lacks appropriate safeguards which could
result in certain physicians exerting undue pressure on a patient or misdiagnosing
a terminal illness.260 Moreover, physicians will have wide latitude in interpreting
ambiguous and inadequately defined provisions of physician-assisted suicide
legislation.26' In determining a patient's prognosis, a physician is often confronted
with difficulties and uncertainties.262 Thus, in deciding if a patient meets the
requirement of a terminally ill patient, which is usually defined as a disease that
will cause death within six months, physicians must use their best judgment and
interpretation of the available scientific literature.263 Also, the Oregon Act does not
forbid a physician from raising the issue of physician-assisted suicide with a
terminally ill patient.264 As a result, a physician must take great caution in deciding
whether or not to encourage physician-assisted suicide due to the strong fiduciary
relationship of a physician and a patient.265
Another problem which exists is the fact that many patients often suffer from
extreme pain before they become terminally ill.266 Thus, if the "right-to-die reflects
the individual's right to be free of inhumane suffering," then it is hard to
distinguish between those patients with terminal illnesses and those diagnosed with
serious, painful, yet not terminal, illnesses.26. Therefore, it is arguable that the right
to physician-assisted suicide should extend beyond those patients who suffer from
terminal illness.268
258. See Anthony L. Back et al., 275 JAMA 919,919 (1996) (describing how frequently physicians
receive requests for physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, the nature of these requests, and
physician responses to these requests).
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V CONCLUSION
In Vacco and Glucksberg, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a general
right to die or right to physician-assisted suicide. 269 However, the Court left the
decision of whether to legalize or ban physician-assisted suicide to individual
states.27 It appears that the attitude about physician-assisted suicide is changing
in the United States.271 For example, the most recent Harris Poll shows that sixty-
eight percent of people responded in the affirmative when asked if terminally ill
patients should be able to obtain prescriptions from their doctors for lethal dosages
of drugs to end their lives.272 Washington and California voters narrowly defeated
ballot measures legalizing physician-assisted suicide in the early nineties, but it
appears that public opinion regarding physician-assisted suicide has changed since
then. 73 While Oregon is the first state to pass legislation legalizing the right to
physician-assisted suicide, the whole nation will undoubtedly watch Oregon
closely to see its trials and tribulations in dealing with such a new area of law. As
a result of the Court's decisions in Vacco and Glucksberg and the subsequent
media coverage, pressure rests on individual states to consider the issue of
physician-assisted suicide. The American public will cast a watchful eye on
Oregon to see how it will implement its experiment and the results that occur.
Many questions have been left unanswered, and Oregon will be the guinea pig in
the area of physician-assisted suicide. Regardless of what happens in Oregon,
there will be much debate between the state legislators and their voters in deciding
whether to allow physician-assisted suicide.
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